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   n what has become a ubiquitous debate over the budget, the 
U.S. Farm Bill plays  an instrumental role. Within the bill are two 
topics crucial to the future of American relations with the devel-
oping world: subsidies to farmers and food aid. Nearly 5 billion 
USD in subsidies are paid to American farmers annually pro-
viding an unfair advantage to domestic producers inconsistent 
with World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. The second 
is the push, promoted by President Obama among others, to re-
move a requirement that all U.S. food aid be grown domestically 
and sent to recipient countries. Reversing the trends of farming 
subsidies and U.S.-sourced food aid could have a massive bene-
ficial impact on the developing world, making U.S. development 
and aid efforts much more productive.
 
One of the most explicit examples of the ability of the U.S. Farm 
Bill negatively to affect a developing economy can be found in 
Haiti.  During the 1970s and 1980s, under the dictatorship of 
Jean Claude Duvalier, Haiti produced enough rice to meet its 
domestic demand. As rice became an affordable source of food 
there was an increase in consumption. A food that had not 
normally been eaten daily became a staple. In the 1980s, at the 
height of the popularity of structural adjustment loans --those 
requiring regulatory changes to receive funds-- from interna-
tional lending organizations, Haiti was pressured to liberalize 
its economy, balance the budget, and privatize large national 
firms. Part of this liberalization included removing tariffs that 
protected many Haitian farmers, particularly rice farmers, from 
imported agricultural goods. While  the results did not manifest 
themselves immediately, their presence would come to be felt 
throughout the coming decade, to the detriment of millions of 
Haitians.
Jean Claude Duvalier was overthrown in 1986. Jean Bertrand 
Aristide, a Salesian priest, emerged from the violent aftermath as 
Haiti’s president in 1991. Aristide’s first term was short-lived; he 
was ousted in that same year by the military, which maintained 
strong ties to Duvalier and had been largely trained by the U.S. 
government. Aristide went  into exile amid pressure from the 
military and spent the next few years petitioning for his return 
to the presidency of Haiti. In 1994 President Clinton and a group 
of U.S. Special Forces and Marines reinstalled Aristide into the 
presidency. 
Aristide returned to a country economically devastated by an 
embargo, perhaps the most economically destructive event in 
Haiti’s history, imposed by the U.S. during the military rule of 
1991-1994. During this time farmers struggled to acquire ba-
sic inputs needed to grow their crops. Industry floundered as 
well. For instance, before the embargo, Haiti had produced a 
large share of the world’s baseballs. As a part of the agreement 
for Aristide’s return, Clinton required that Haiti make good on 
promises to comply with structural adjustment plans by the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The price Hai-
tians paid for Aristide’s return came in the form of a reduction 
in rice tariffs from 50% to 3%.
 
The results could have been predicted. Haiti’s market was forced 
open to subsidized U.S. rice, which flowed into the country at 
an astonishing rate. Haiti quickly became the second largest 
market for U.S. rice exports and remains in the top five to this 
day. Cheap rice from the U.S. caused the value of Haitian rice 
to plummet. Farmers in the Artibonite valley, where most of 
Haiti’s rice production occurs, moved to Port-au-Prince to find 
work elsewhere, as farming was no longer economically com-
petitive. Haitian rice production dropped; while the market 
price of rice for the average Haitian remained low, few people 
seemed concerned about the origins or the actual cost of the 
rice they consumed.
 
In 2008, a combination of massive flooding from hurricanes and 
a spike in commodity prices worldwide left Haiti particularly 
vulnerable to food production decreases. As food prices around 
the world skyrocketed, demonstrations in Haiti quickly became 
violent in some regions, resulting in the removal of Jacques-
Edouard Alexis as 
prime minister. Hai-
tian consumers were 
no longer benefitting 
from the low price of 
American-subsidized 
rice. National produc-
tion was only a frac-
tion of what it once 
was, woefully insuf-
ficient to sustain the 
needs of the country. 
A country that had 
been self-sufficient 
in rice production 
just thirty years prior 
had become one of 
the most food-inse-
cure countries in the 
world. The situation 
was bad enough that 
it even caused a noted 
politician to apologize; President Clinton, an early advocate of 
structural adjustment who has become one of Haiti’s supporters 
post-earthquake, stated in 2010:
 
“Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy until the last 
year or so, we started rethinking it, that we rich countries that 
produce a lot of food should sell it to poor countries and relieve 
them of the burden of producing their own food.
 . . . It has not worked. It’s maybe been good for some of my 
farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake, it 
was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not pointing the finger 
at anybody. I did that. I have to live every day with the conse-
quences of the lost capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to 
feed those people because of what I did. Nobody else.” (2010.)
 
Haiti, like many developing countries, has seen an inordinate 
amount of foreign aid and investment flow towards industri-
alization in the past, to the detriment of its agricultural sector. 
This trend of ignoring agriculture has begun to change. Efforts 
to strengthen Haitian rice production have intensified since 
2008 and again since the 2010 earthquake. By some estimates 
Haiti has over a million acres of land previously occupied that 
could again be utilized productively for agricultural purposes. 
Given the history mentioned above, Haiti is more than capable 
of increasing production and feeding Haitians.
 
Haiti itself is not without blame in this story. Widespread corrup-
tion and lack of supportive institutions have certainly contrib-
uted to the current economic and social state. Decades of abuse 
of power by both government officials and the elite minority 
have left the Hai-
tian majority with 
few avenues for im-
proving their eco-
nomic status. The 
inability to sustain 
long periods of po-
litical stability has 
further complicat-
ed any efforts of re-
form. Furthermore, 
disasters including 
the 2010 earth-
quake, vulnerabil-
ity to hurricanes 
and flooding, and 
the introduction 
of cholera by Unit-
ed Nations peace-
keepers from Nepal 
prove to be massive 
setbacks that will 
require strong lead-
ership by the Haitian government to overcome.
 
Changes in the U.S. Farm Bill alone will not solve Haiti’s food 
security problems. There has to be a concerted effort by both 
Haiti and the international community for serious reforms in 
a multitude of sectors in order for Haiti to grow. Foreign aid, 
NGOs, and domestic policy in Haiti will have to work together 
with stated goals of coordination in order for change to occur. 
However, if the U.S. government is interested in seeing devel-
oping countries like Haiti grow, it must be willing to open its 
own agricultural sector to the world by eliminating subsidies 
and barriers to trade, as it demands of other nations.
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The aid group CIDSE helps this young Haitian girl with her family’s harvest of black beans. | Photo: CIDSE
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